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The Right of Peoples to Self-Determination in Article 1 of the
Human Rights Covenants as a Claimable Right
James Summers
Lancaster University
This article looks at the potential for individual communications under common article 1 of
the Human Rights Covenants, in particular, under the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It first outlines the problems posed by the
drafting of common article 1, in particular, the identity of peoples. It then considers how
individuals might be able to claim peoples’ rights through representation and the
collectivization of individual rights.
__________________________________________________________________________________

The

legal implementation of the right of peoples to self-determination has always been
difficult. After the right was initially popularized in the period following the First World War,
Sarah Wambaugh mused: “No group, however small, should be without its day in court.”1
Legal mechanisms for claiming such a right, however, have proved far from straightforward.
Many human rights treaties have mechanisms that allow individuals to bring claims over the
violation of their rights. These procedures have been integral to enforcement of the regional
European, Inter-American, and African systems and are also an option for the twin Human
Rights Covenants. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has the
most established and widely used communications procedure, with 116 parties to its Optional
Protocol I 1966.2 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’
(ICESCR) Optional Protocol 2008 is more recent and currently has 24 states parties.3
The ability to bring a complaint over self-determination through such systems, however,
is limited. Few human rights instruments actually proclaim such a right. The African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, in articles 19–24, and the twin covenants, in common article
1, are the only human rights treaties that do so. Moreover, while the individuals claiming a
human rights violation are intended to be self-evident, the “peoples” claiming peoples’ rights
are more ambiguous and contested. The Human Rights Committee (HRC), which implements
the ICCPR, has effectively closed the door on individual communications under article 1 of
that covenant. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which
implements the ICESCR, by contrast, has not excluded the potential for communications
under article 1 for its covenant, and this body forms the focus for this article.
This article explores an obstacle that claims under article 1 inevitably face under the
ICESCR Optional Protocol: how individuals can bring a claim on behalf of a people. It looks
at the content of common article 1 and potential obstacles to communications that might arise
from it. It examines the drafting of the article and practice by the two committees. It also
draws from jurisprudence under the African Charter, the only regional human rights system to
directly recognize peoples’ rights, and the Inter-American system, where they have been
recognized indirectly.

James Summers is a lecturer in law and director of the Centre for International Law and Human Rights at
Lancaster University.
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The Two Committees and Rights in Article 1 of the Human Rights
Covenants
The right of peoples to self-determination in common article 1 of the human rights covenants
differs from the other rights in the covenants in two ways. First, unlike the other covenant
rights, which are individually focused, the article is held by a collective group, a people.
Second, it is the only right common to the two covenants, though it could have different
significance for each one. The first paragraph of the article reads:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
This statement reflects a division between political status, which can be freely determined,
and economic, social, and cultural development, which can be freely pursued, reflecting a
distinction between civil and political and economic, social, and cultural rights. The economic
aspects of self-determination are then expanded on in the second paragraph, through a right to
dispose of resources:
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
The right to resources in article 1(2) is phrased in qualified terms as a balance of five
interconnected elements.4 The right of peoples to dispose of their resources is subject to
obligations from international economic cooperation, the principle of mutual benefit, and
international law. The drafting left the content of each of these elements and their relationship
ambiguous,5 though they can be seen essentially to frame a relationship between states or
between states and investors.6 The last sentence provides that regardless of this balance,
peoples are not to be deprived of their means of subsistence, which suggests a relationship
between a state’s government and its people. This provision reflects an ultimate guarantee to
prevent, as the Saudi representative explained at the time, “a weak or penniless government
from seriously compromising a country’s future by granting concessions in the economic
sphere—a frequent occurrence in the nineteenth century.”7 While deprivation of means of
subsistence, like other elements in article 1(2), was never defined, this provision underlines
an intention for it to provide a basic level of economic protection. Moreover, one of the few
examples cited to illustrate the provision, the removal of a tribe from their ancestral land in
Tanganyika, also suggests a relationship between a government and communities within a
state or a similar territory.8
Although the content of paragraph 2 was never clarified, another ambiguity in article 1
posed an even greater challenge to its implementation—the identity of the peoples who held
the right. While the inclusion of the article was inspired by the then ongoing decolonization
process and justified on the basis that self-determination was the prerequisite for human
rights, it was less clear how individuals related to a people as a collective group. The concept
of peoples was subject to competing claims and some of those envisioned the break-up of
states. Article 1, unlike other provisions on self-determination, does not explicitly protect the
territorial integrity of states. It does so implicitly.9 Nonetheless, the right could be seen as an
existential threat by many states’ parties and this possibility of secession has made it a
difficult right for the HRC and CESCR to implement.
These difficulties have expressed themselves most decisively in the practice of the HRC.
This committee can receive communications from individuals over potential violations of
ICCPR rights by states parties to its Optional Protocol I. But the HRC quickly took the
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position that the rights in article 1 were not available for individual communication and has
consistently maintained this stance.10 This was the only instance where the committee refused
to receive communications over a right in the covenant.
The issues behind this refusal—controversy over the identity of peoples and the scope of
self-determination—were evident in the first communication brought under the protocol. In A.
D. v. Canada (Mikmaq Tribal Society) the grand captain of the society asserted that Canada
had denied self-determination for the Mikmaq people and insisted that “the Mikmaq nation be
recognised as a State.”11 The committee dismissed this claim in 1984 on the grounds that the
author had not shown himself to be the authorized representative of the society.12 This
decision, committee member Roger Errera noted, left open whether the Mikmaq constituted a
“people” and whether self-determination could be claimed by individuals.13 In Kitok v.
Sweden (1988), however, the committee simply adopted the stand that individuals cannot
claim to be victims of a breach of article 1,14 a stance it has consistently maintained.15 The
committee also explained that this position meant that it did not need to address whether the
groups in question were peoples.16 The committee’s approach on the article is more restrictive
than the actual wording of Optional Protocol I, which provides for the committee’s
competence over communications on “any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.”17 It also
sat uncomfortably with the committee’s finding in General Comment No. 12 (1984) that selfdetermination was “essential . . . for the effective guarantee of observance of individual rights
and for promotion and strengthening of those rights.”18 The committee has subsequently
recognized a role for article 1 in the interpretation of other covenant rights. These are the
rights of persons belonging to ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities in article 2719 and
rights to vote and participate in government in article 25.20 Nonetheless, the effect of this
interpretative role has been marginal because there has been little clarification on what article
1 actually contributes to those articles.
The context in the ICESCR is somewhat different. The framework for individual
communications under this covenant developed much later than the ICCPR. In contrast to
civil and political rights, which could be immediately violated by state actions, it was
questioned whether economic and social rights, which are progressively realized, lend
themselves to a communications procedure. Nevertheless, an individual communications
procedure was established in the ICESCR Optional Protocol 2008, which entered into force in
2013. Article 2 of the protocol allows communications over “a violation of any of the
economic, social and cultural rights set forth in the Covenant.” This phrase has significance
for article 1 because by being narrower than the equivalent provision in the ICCPR Protocol it
provides a focus for potential claims. The CESCR in drafting the protocol was conscious of
the danger of being seen to encourage secession21 but also reluctant to follow the restrictive
stance of the HRC.22 The solution was that “only the economic, social and cultural aspects of
the right to self-determination could be the subject of communications.”23 This narrowed
focus not only followed the committee’s mandate but enabled them to avoid the difficult
political questions that fell more squarely within the scope of the HRC. Conversely, this focus
allowed the committee to concentrate on the economic, social, and cultural role of peoples’
rights in the covenant. Committee member Philip Alston in a discussion on the protocol cited
the protection of a people’s means of subsistence as an example of how self-determination
relates to economic, social, and cultural rights.24 Thus, the Optional Protocol creates the
potential for communications against states parties under article 1 within an economic, social,
and cultural context.
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The Authors of Communications and Connections between Individual and
Peoples’ Rights
Potential article 1 communications under the ICESCR Optional Protocol necessarily raise the
issue of the connection between peoples’ rights and the individuals who bring the
communication, a relationship that has remained unresolved since Mikmaq Tribal Society.
Individuals certainly form the collective groups known as “peoples,” but peoples’ rights are
exercised by the group as a whole, not by particular individuals. Individuals have been able to
bring complaints over violations of peoples’ rights in a relatively small number of cases under
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Individuals and organizations have
successfully raised peoples’ rights violations for groups within states—in the Southern
Cameroons, Darfur, and for the Ogoni, the Endrois, and the Ogiek. But there is a crucial
difference in the African system. The African Charter does not require the authors of a
communication to be the actual victim of a violation of one of its rights.25 Thus, there is no
obstacle to individuals’ raising a peoples’ rights violation that can then be judged on its own
merits.
By contrast, both the ICECR Optional Protocol and the ICCPR Optional Protocol require
authors of a communication to be the “victim” of a breach of the right in the relevant
covenant.26 Article 2 of the ICESCR Optional Protocol refers to claims “by or on behalf of
individuals or groups of individuals” that are “claiming to be victims of a violation” of the
covenant’s rights.27 This provision requires a specific connection between peoples’ rights and
the rights of individuals claiming a breach of those rights. If a clear distinction is maintained
between collective rights and individual rights then the two simply do not connect. The HRC
has essentially taken this position.
If the collective nature of peoples’ rights does not form an insurmountable barrier to
individual communication, however, there needs to be a way to connect them. There are two
potential ways to link individuals to peoples’ rights. The first is representation. Article 2
allows communications “on behalf of” a “group of individuals,” which might equate to a
people, with their consent, unless the author can justify acting on their behalf without such
consent. Individuals might be able to bring claims over peoples’ rights if they have this
consent. In self-governing communities, essentially indigenous and tribal peoples, there may
be leaders who can express the relevant consent, either individually or by a delegation. This
authority was partially addressed in Mikmaq Tribal Society, because the inability of the
author to show himself as the authorized representative of the society led to the rejection of
the communication.28 Whether an individual could demonstrate this authority was left open in
the later, Lubicon Lake decision. In this communication, an alleged article 1 violation was
raised by Bernard Ominayak, chief of the Lubicon Lake Band, who was described as the
band’s “leader and representative.”29 The HRC, though, did not engage with this issue; it
simply dismissed individual claims over article 1 in their entirety.30 Thus, the issue of
representation remains to be decided.
The second approach would be to treat peoples’ rights as collective counterparts to
individually framed rights. This approach requires establishing a nexus between peoples’
rights and the other rights in the covenant so that a violation of those rights would determine a
breach of article 1. Such a connection can be seen in African jurisprudence. In COHRE v.
Sudan (2009) the “nature and magnitude” of a violation of economic, social, and cultural
rights and other individual rights in Darfur supported a violation of the peoples’ right to
development in article 22 of the charter.31 Likewise, in Ogoniland (2001) widespread human
rights violations were cited as contributing to a breach of the right to dispose of resources in
article 21 of the charter.32 Alternatively, in Endorois (2009) and Ogiek Community (2017) the
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peoples’ right to resources drew from a communal interpretation of the right to property,
which was itself based on the traditions of the group.33
The protection of means of subsistence provides an obvious potential nexus between
economic and social rights and article 1. The CESCR made such a connection in relation to
the right to water in General Comment No. 15. The committee called on states parties to
“ensure that there is adequate access to water for subsistence farming and for securing the
livelihoods of indigenous peoples” under article 1(2).34 Moreover, this connection might not
be limited just to the right to water but might encompass other aspects of the right to an
adequate standard of living in article 11 of the ICESCR, including the right to food35 and
housing36 and the right to health.37 CESCR in General Comment No. 21 also emphasized the
importance of respect for rights to land and resources in protecting the right to culture for
indigenous communities.38
This nexus also corresponds to jurisprudence in regional systems that has addressed
either peoples’ rights or a communal interpretation of individual rights. There is an overlap
between the two. The survival of an indigenous community was a crucial element in the a
communal interpretation of the right to property developed by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights in its landmark Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua case (2001).39 The
court identified three aspects to “survival”—physical, cultural, and intergenerational—and in
later cases treated the concept as interchangeable with “subsistence.”40 Physical survival
involved protecting the land and resources necessary for the physical integrity of an
indigenous community, such as food, water, housing, and medicinal plants.41 Cultural
survival focused on the necessary resources for spiritual ties,42 while intergenerational
survival concerned the transmission of culture to future generations.43 The African
Commission in Endorois built on this jurisprudence, with physical and cultural survival once
again equated with subsistence,44 providing the touchstone for both a communal
interpretation of the right to property45 and the peoples’ right to resources.46
Survival has also defined the conditions for legitimate interference with those rights. In
Inter-American and African cases involving resources, interference required consultation,
which needed to be timely, conducted in good faith with the aim to achieve consent, based on
respect for local institutions and informed by social and environmental-impact assessment.47
This approach corresponds with standards supported by the CESCR in relation to the
exploitation of resources under article 1. The committee considered that consultation in those
circumstances should be (1) timely, with “sufficient time and opportunity to reflect and take a
decision,”48 (2) inclusive, reflecting the traditions and culture of the community,49 (3)
informed by a human rights and environmental impact assessment,50 and (4) effective, though
the role of consent has varied.51
The two approaches to connecting individual claimants with peoples’ rights emphasize
different aspects of a group. The first focuses on the leadership of a community and the
second on the rights of its individual members. While these two approaches could
complement each other, there is also potential for conflict between them.
Practice by the HRC on communications over article 27 of the ICCPR has pointed to the
potential for different interpretations of rights within sections of an indigenous community. In
Apirina Mahuika v. New Zealand (2000), the authors represented seven tribes (iwi) within the
Maori people who objected to a memorandum of understanding that had been agreed to by a
majority of tribes with the government.52 They raised their objections under the right to
resources in article 1, though the committee considered it only as a minority rights issue
under article 27. The committee considered that there might be circumstances in which
individuals belonging to a minority within a group might be considered separately, but there
needed to be “reasonable and objective justification” to do so.53 In Paadar v. Finland (2014),
the authors, who were Sami reindeer herders, alleged a violation of article 27 read with article
5
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1 due to common limits on the number of reindeer across two communities. They argued that
different natural conditions and higher exposure to predators meant that those limits
disproportionately affected them. The committee as a whole concluded that it did not have
sufficient information to determine a breach.54 A dissenting opinion by four members argued,
however, that a reasonable and objective justification necessary for the continued viability
and welfare of the minority did not support those measures.55
Further guidance can also be found in the Inter-American Court’s decision in Saramaka
v. Suriname (2005). In this case, Suriname argued that the authors of the complaint had not
been authorized to represent the Saramaka people by its paramount leader, the Gaa’man. The
court, however, dismissed this objection under the principle of effectiveness, which meant
that the authority to make communications needed to be interpreted broadly.56 This decision
might support a broader approach to the individuals who might be able to represent a
community.

Conclusion
Self-determination remains a controversial right, and ambiguities in the drafting of the human
rights covenants have created problems for the HRC and CESCR. These ambiguities have led
the HRC to refuse to accept individual communications under article 1. The CESCR, though,
has indicated that it could consider article 1 communications within an economic, social, and
cultural context. This still leaves the issue of the connection between individual complainants
and peoples’ rights violation to be resolved. The ICESCR Optional Protocol requires that
communications are brought by or on behalf of a victim of a right, but individuals may not
necessarily connect to such rights. There are two possible approaches to such a connection.
First, representatives of a people could give consent to the communication. Second, an
overlap might be found between individual economic, social, and cultural rights and peoples’
rights. The protection of a peoples’ means of subsistence provides the most obvious
connection. Moreover, while drawing from individual rights, this approach is not duplicative.
Article 1(2) focuses on the right to resources, which in the context of indigenous communities
has meant the protection of property rights. Neither covenant contains a specific right to
property, so making article 1 available to communications partially fills this gap. Moreover,
the deprivation of a people’s means of subsistence reflects the gravity of some violations of
economic and social rights, depriving a community of its means of support. As such, the
availability of article 1 to individual communications could serve an important role in
strengthening the ICESCR.
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